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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OP THE

STATE OF UTAH
MATTHEW PAGANO, C A R M E N
PAGANO and MILLEO PAGANO,
Case No.
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
13864
MARY P. WALKER,
Defendant and Appellant. J
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Plaintiffs against their
sister, the Defendant, to impress a constructive trust upon
certain proceeds placed in joint-tenancy accounts by
Plaintiffs' and Defendant's mother in her own name and
in the name of the Defendant, Mary P. Walker.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court with an advisory
jury. From a verdict by the Jury and Judgment by tihe
Court in favor of the Plaintiffs, Defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Judgment of the
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Lower Court and for a Judgment in her favor as a
matter of law, or that failing for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs and Defendant are sons and daughter
of one Lucy Pagano who died on the 12th day of June,
1972. Lucy and her husband immigrated to Utah where
they, by hard labor and shrewd investments, accumulated a sizeable estate in joint tenancy between them.
At the death of Lucy's husband, Lucy then became the
sole owner of all of the accumulations of property as the
surviving joint tenant. Lucy was thus familiar with the
legal implications of a joint-tenant estate. All of the
children had worked with their parents during part of
their lives (TR 24 L 21-30; TR 25, L 1-12). After the
death of Lucy's husband, Lucy then caused certain accounts to be set up between herself and her daughter,
the Defendant Mary P. Walker, as joint tenants with
full rights of survivorship and nothing more. The only
evidence offered in tJiis respect was the pass books and
the statement by the Defendant that as each one of the
accounts were set up they were explained to Lucy and
Mary by the bank officials receiving the deposit (TR
49 L 16-30; TR 50 L 1-11; TR 181 L 12-30; TR 182 L
1-16). There were no reservations or representations
made by Lucy as each of the accounts were established
altering or limiting the joint tenancy arrangements.
Lucy also placed some water stock in her name and one
of the Plaintiffs as joint tenants. She also caused to be
made a Last Will and Testament, and left an estate to
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be probated and divided among her children (TR 50 L
17-30).
The evidence shows that Plaintiffs from time to time
visited with their mother, and Lucy from time to time
made certain gifts to Plaintiffs and Defendant in differing sums. Evidence further shows that Mary was and
is suffering from arthritis, which is progressively becoming more and more serious; and that Lucy was aware of
her condition (TR 18 L 14-21). Mary spent a great deal
of time with Lucy — took her to the banks, assisted
her in all of her business ventures, called her almost
every day ,and spent much more time with her than any
of the Plaintiffs (TR 30 L 1-24). Defendant made withdrawals during Lucy's lifetime and afterward. Lucy died
in 1972 and the Will of Lucy was duly admitted to probate in the District Court of Weber County and is now
in the process of being probated, involving the property
designated in her will (TR 50 L 17-30; TR 51, L 1-17).
The joint-tenancy accounts between Lucy and the Defendant were not listed in the probate and Defendant
claimed to be the owner of the same as the surviving
joint tenant. Shortly after Lucy's death Plaintiffs claim
that Defendant stated to them, "Mother told me to pay
her personal bills, keep a little out for my arthritis and
divide up the rest." Defendant denies that die ever
made this statement, but rather told her brothers, the
Plaintiffs, that if they would not cause trouble she would
consider giving them a part of the money she claimed
by right of survivorship in the joint-tenancy bank ac-
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counts on her own, but that she would decide if, when,
and how much (TR 193 L 17-29; TR 194 L 1-7; TR 54
L 8-14; TR 59 L 19-28). The Court submitted the matter
to the Jury on the question: "Do you find it proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant,
Mary P. Walker, shortly after her mother's death, made
the following statement in the presence of other family
members, 'Mother told me to pay her personal bills, keep
a little out for my arthritis and divide up the rest.'?" The
Jury then returned the verdict unanimously as "yes."
The Court then requested written memoranda from counsel, and set the matter for further hearing on the 29th
day of July, 1974, where evidence was taken showing
that Defendant did in fact have arthritis to a rather
serious degree. That the doctor would anticipate it would
become progressivley worse and the cost of treatment
would become progressively higher (Dr. Ward TR 277290). The matter was again submitted to the Court; the
Court made its Judgment accepting the answer of the
July to the interrogatory, impressed a trust upon the
funds in joint tenancy with Defendant, denied Defendant
any amount for her arthritis, and ordered the money in
the accounts to be divided equally among the parties.
During the course of the trial Defendant offered evidence through her witness, Lynn A. Walker, husband of
the Defendant and coadministrator of the Lucy Pagano
Estate, concerning whether or not Lucy had ever stated
that she did not want iher sons to know about the hank
accounts in question (TR 253 L 14-19), and again made
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5
a proffer of evidence to the effect that the said Lynn A.
Walker would testify that prior to her death Lucy had
stated: "Here are the books, Mary. The boys are just
waiting for me to die; they want to get their hands on
some of this money, but I want you to pay my personal
bills. And after that the rest of the money is yours." The
Court refused the proffer of evidence on the theory that
he was an interesited party and, hence, disqualified under
ithe provisions of the Deadman's Statute (TR 55 L 1-8;
TR 269 L 16-29).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT
THE FINDING OF THE COURT BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE T H A T
THE DEFENDANT, MARY P. WALKER,
STATED: "MOTHER TOLD ME TO PAY
HER PERSONAL BILLS, KEEP A LITTLE
OUT FOR MY ARTHRITIS AND DIVIDE
UP THE REST."
In reviewing all of the testimony offered and received in this matter, the only evidence that could support the Court's finding is that testimony of Plaintiffs,
Carmen, Pagano, Matthew Pagano, Milleo Pagano, and
the wife of Milleo Pagano, Margaret, alleging that Mary
Walker, the Defendant, stated to them the words set out
above. Mary Walker has vigorously denied ever making
the statement attributed to her above, and her husband,
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Lynn A. Walker, testified that he had never heard her
make this statement although he had been with her during the times referred to by the Plaintiffs.
It is well established in Utah, that in order to alter
or avoid the terms of a written, joint-tenancy account,
or to impress a trust upon such accounts as against the
surviving joint tenant, that the evidence must be dear
and convincing. It is also well established that the clear
and convincing evidence must be evidence of the intent
of the parties establishing the joint-tenancy accounts
from their own funds at the date of the creation of the
joint-tenancy accouiut. In other words, if Lucy Pagano
established a joint-tenancy account with the Defendant,
Mary Walker, by signing the joint^tenancy contracts with
the various banking institutions and there is no evidence
of any other intent at the time of the creation of such
accounts, as is the case here, then such accounts must
stand. We submit there is nothing further offered by
Plaintiffs to substantiate their admission, and to the contrary, other evidence indicated that it was extremely
unlikely that the Defendant, Mary P. Walker, had made
this statement.
In reviewing the evidence, it should be noted, and
this was not controverted by any of the parties to this
suit, (1) that Lucy, the mother of the parties, received
most of her property by way of joint tenancy with her
deceased husband; (2) it was admitted that during her
lifetime Lucy had made various gifts to each of her children and the gifts were never made in the exact amount
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to each of them; (3) each of the children spent varying
times with their mother, both in personal visitations and
work on the farm; (4) Lucy Pagano not only created
the joint-tenancy accounts in the Defendant, Mary P.
Walker,, and her alone, but also in addition, left an
estate to be probated where the property was in her
name alone, so that all of her children, Plaintiffs and
Defendant Mary P. Walker, would receive properties
from such estate; and (5) the only evidence brought
before the Court was that at the time Lucy Pagano created the joint-tenancy accounts and signed the agreements with the banks, each time one was created the
official handling the transaction read the joint-tenancy
agreement to Lucy and she understood the same and
signed each of them, and made no written or verbal limitation on any of them. There was no other evidence of
a contrary intent offered by Plaintiffs at any time. All
of these facts, together with the reasonable inferences
arising therefrom, we feel should make it obvious that
Lucy did not, at the time she created the joint-tenancy
accounts with the Defendant, Mary P. Walker, intend
to divide all of her property equally among her children.
It seems obvious that she did not create a constructive
trust with the funds in said joint bank accounts, and
with this in mind it would seem obvious that Mary P.
Walker would not have said the words put into her mouth
by individuals who would profit by such words. Mary
vigorously denied having made the alleged statement,
stating that she had, in effect, told them that if they did
not cause trouble for her she would consider setting
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aside some of the funds left to her in the joint-tenancy
accounts and divide them with her brothers as she saw
fit. It would seem that Defendant, Mary P. Walker,
rightfully anticipated that if her brothers found that she
was left funds outside of the estate of Lucy Pagano they
would cause her trouble, and her fears were borne out,
as is evidenced by their conduct. We submit that as a
matter of law the Plaintiffs did not prove this necessary
allegation by clear and convincing evidence or even by
a preponderance of the evidence. The law is not such
that the Court must give a Judgment based upon the
number of witnesses testifying for versus the number
of witnesses testifying against, and it is our position that
had the Count given proper consideration to the admitted
facts and circumstances surrounding this case its ruling
would have been different. The testimony of Lynn
Walker should have been admitted, since he was not a
disqualified witness and his offered testimony was relevan and competent.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT THERE WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST ON THE FUNDS PLACED IN
JOINT-TENANCY BY LUCY P A G A N O
WITH HERSELF AND THE DEFENDANT,
MARY P. WALKER.
The only possible basis for the establishment of a
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constructive trust on the joint-tenancy funds would be
the statement allegedly made by Mary P. Walker, the
Defendant. If it is determined that Mary did not in fact
make such a statement, then the claim by Plaintiffs
that a constructive trust was established must fail. There
was absolutely no other evidence to support such a claim.
Even if it is found that Mary did make such a statement, the claim of a constructive trust still must fail as
a matter of law.
Plaintiffs, at the time of trial, amended their Complaint and admitted that Lucy Pagano did in fact set up
joint-tenancy accounts with Defendant, Mary P. Walker,
and that Mary became the owner of the money, but then
claim that sometime later her ownership became that
of a trustee. We respectfully submit that at this time
the transfer was made to Lucy and Mary and they in
fact were the joint owners of the funds and could not
later change the legal relationship to one of a trust without Mary's consent.
There is absolutely no evidence offered by Plaintiffs
to show that Lucy later attempted to set up a trust, or
that Mary agreed to a trust relationship. There is no
evidence as to when Lucy might have tried to do so, or
that Mary might have consented to do so.
In Restatement of Trusts, 2d, ch. 2 §25, the rule is
stated as follows:
" (a) The test. The rule stated in this section
is applicable although the settlor has called the
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transaction a trust. No trust is created unless
he manifests an intention to impose duties which
aire enforceable in the Courts.
(b) Precatory words. On the one hand a settlor may manifest an intention to create a trust;
on the other h*ind his manifestation of intention
may amount merely to a suggestion or a wish
that the transferee should use or dispose of the
property in a certain manner leaving it to the
transferee to follow the suggestion or comply
with the wish only if the transferee desires to
do so. No trust is created if the settlor manifests
an intention to impose a merely, moral obligation. In determining the intention of the settlor
the following circumstances, among others, are
considered: (1) the imperative or precatory
character of the words used; (2) the definiteness
or indefiniteness of the property; (3) the definiteness or the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries
or of the extent of their interest * * *."
In Re^tatemente of Trusts, 2d, ch. 2 §38 (1), the
text states as follows;
"If the owner of property transfers it intervivos
to another person by an instrument in which it
is declared that the transferee is to take the
property for his own benefit, extrinsic evidence,
in the absence of fraud, duress, mistake, or other
ground for reformation or recession is not admissible to show that he was intended to hold
the property in trust."
If the owner of property transferred it intervivos
to another person as trastee, a trust may be created, but
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no evidence was introduced by plaintiffs to this effect.
All of the deposits were made by Lucy to herself and
Mary Walker as individuals with no reservation or indication of trusteeship or declaration thereof. Defendant's
testimony was that at no time did she ever understand
or intend the money in the joint-tenancy accounts to be
held in trust. To the contrary, she stated, according to
her testimony which was never disputed, that the money
was hers and that if there was no trouble she would see
about giving the plaintiffs, on her own, some of it. This
is a far cry from a statement or declaration of trust. She
stated further that she had done everything her mother
had asked her to do — keep it (TR 193 L 15-22).
A gift once made remains a gift and cannot be retrieved in whole or in part without the consent of the
giver and the givee.
Giving full credence to the evidence offered by plaintiffs we feel their allegation that Mary holds the funds
in trust must fail. They have shown that their mother
understood the implications of joint-tenancy accounts
through her husband's estate; that she had made previous gifts to the children in unequal amounts; had placed
other property in her name and one of the sons as joint
tenants; and had left other property in her name alone
to be distributed under the terms of her will.
To alter or defeat the creation of a joint-tenancy
account as established by Lucy agano with the Defen-
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dant, Mary Walker, and to create a constructive trust
from such a joint-tenancy account, Plaintiffs must do
so by clear and convincing evidence.
There have been a great number of cases defining
"clear and convincing proof." In Words and Phrases,
Vol. 7, p. 603, and in the pocket supplement there is
quoted many cases,, including a Utah case defining the
words "clear and convincing" as "evidence to be clear
and convincing must be such that there is no serious or
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion."
[Emphasis ours.] Norther est, Inc. v. Walker Bank and
Trust Company, (1950), 122 Utah 268, 248 P. 2d 692,
698.
The Colorado Supreme Court has defined "clear and
convincing evidence'3 as follows: "Clear and convincing
evidence is evidence which is stronger than a preponderance of the evidence and which is unmistakable and free
from serious or substantial doubt" [Emphasis ours.]
Dahman v. Ford Leasing Development Company, 492
P. 2d 875, 877.
New Mexico — "Evidence is clear and convincing in
support of the essential elements of deceipt only if it instantly tilts the scales in the affirmative on each element,
when weighed against evidence in opposition and fact
finders mind is left with an abiding conviction that
charges as to each element are proved." Hackett v. Winks,
485 P. 2d 353, 355. [Emphasis ours.]
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Illinois — "Clear and convincing evidence is that
quantum of proof which leaves no reasonable doubt in
the minds of the trier of facts of truth of facts in issue"
In re Weaver's Estate, 220 N. E. 2d 321, 322. [Emphasis
ours.]
California — "Clear and convincing evidence is that
evidence which is so clear, explicit and unequivocal as to
leave no substantial doubt which is sufficiently strong
to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable
mind" Petition of Jost, 256 P. 2d 71, 74.
These definitions of "clear and convincing" evidence
seem to be generally withi nthe definitions accepted and
required by our law.
In a recent and similar case decided by the Utah
Supreme Court in 1972 — Del Porto v. Nicola, 27 Utah
2d 286, 495 P. 2d 811, the facte were as follows: Angelina
and Delbert Del Porto were of Italian origin, came into
this country from Italy and were frugal and industrious.
They had reared their family of three children and had
acquired a rather sizeable estate. The children had
worked with their parents in accumulating the property.
(These facts are almost exactly the facts in the case
before this Court at this time.) Angelina had deeded
certain real property to her son and daughter-in-law. Subsequently, her husband, Delbert, passed away and a suit
was filed by Delbert's administrator against the deced-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
ent's son and daughter-in-law to recover certain of the
real property theretofore deeded to them by Angelina.
The Court, in refusing to impose a constructive trust for
the other heirs of ^the Del Portos noted "a plenitude of
conflicting evidence" but found that all of the deeds were
made by Angelina while she was competent and there
was no fraud, duress, or undue influence involved; that
they were properly delivered and therefore there was
no intent to create a trust for the other heirs. Thene was
a considerable amount of evidence in support of Plaintiff's contention in the Del Porto case, but virtually none
in the instant case t>efore this Court.
In another similar case our Supreme Court stated:
"It is true that where an intention to create a joint-tenancy is clearly expressed in a written contract executed
by the parties which remains unaltered, and there is no
evidence of fraud, undue influence, mistake or other infirmity, the question of intention ceasces to be an issue
and the courts are bound by the agreement." First Security Bank of Utah v. Burgi, 122 Utah 445, 251 P. 2d
297. Once again, this case is similar to the one before
the Court at this time. The contracts were clear, they
were written, executed by the parties, and theore is absolutely no evidence of fraud, undue influence, mistake,
or other infirmity. This case presents merely a question
of law, and the Court need not accord any favored position to the trial court. Makoff, Trustees, v. Makoff,
Utah 2d

, Case No. 13577 (Filed Nov. 19, 1974).
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In Jewel v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P. 2d 594,
decided by our Supreme Court in 1961, the facts show
that Plaintiffs were brothers of the Defendant, Ethel
Homer. The p a r t e ' father had deeded property to the
Defendant at the time he was considering remarriage
after the death of his wife. The deed from the father
to the Defendant, Ethel, purported to convey the property to Ethel for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good
and valuable consideration, subject to a life estate reserved to the grantor, and in the event of remarriage a
life estate in his wife. The evidence adduced by Plaintiffs was testimony from a Mr. Jensen, a realtor and
friend of the Jewel family, that Mr. Jewel had stated
that he wanted to keep the property away from his
proposed second wife and he wanted the property to go
to his children. One of the Plaintiffs, Clarence Jewel,
Jr., testified to three conversations with his father —
once again as in the present case, self-serving, wherein
the father purportedly told him that the home would
eventually go to the boys. That he, the father, was going
to divide up the property among the boys and that he
was going to put the deed in Ethel's name for safekeeping
for her and the boys, so that his proposed wife would not
be able to touch it. Clarence's testimony was also to the
effect that there had been a number of discussions prior
to the father's death that it was the general understanding that the deed was given to Ethel to insure that the
property would remain in the family and equally shared
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by all. The Plaintiff, Jessie M. Jewel, testified as to
two specific conversations with the father. One was to
the effect that the father was planning to get married
and would make a deed out to Ethel for safe-keeping, or
to be held so that the second wife would not have a
chance to ge in on it, and to keep the property for the
family — for Ethel and the boys. The second conversation was allegedly to the effect that the father was happy
that he had taken aire of the deed to keep the property
for the family so that the children of his second wife
could not claim an interest therein. Plaintiff, Argel Jewel stated that he had conversations with the father,
wherein his father indicated that he would split up the
ground between the boys and give Ethel the portion with
the home on it. Jewel also testified that the father stated
he had placed the home in Ethers name in trust for all
of the children, and o^er the years there had been many
conversations, in substance — that the house was left in
Ethers name in trust for the whole family with a home
for her to Eve in as long as she wished. In behalf of Defendant, Ethel, Plaintiff's witness, Vaughn Soffe, a funeral director, stated that he had had a conversation with
the father, and Mr. Soffe stated that the father led him
to believe Ethel was to have the home. Ethel herself
denied that her father had ever stated she was to have
the property in safe-ke*3ping or trust for herself and her
brothers. She stated the deed was made exactly as her
father had desired, with no trust to be imposed upon
the same. The trial court imposed the trust upon the
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property and this Court reversed the same; in so doing,
the Court stated:
"This case is one in equity, the dominant question here is whether the Plaintiffs by dear, convincing, and satisfactory proof established the
alleged parole trust with respect to the real
property. The trial court so found and this
Court upon review should not set aside the finding of the lower Court unless it manifestiy appears that the lower court has misapplied proven
facts or that the finding is clearly against the
weight of the evidence. For the reasons to be
stated we are of the opinion that the trial court's
finding of a parole trust is clearly against the
weight of the evidence and must be set aside.
"The transfer of his home by father to Ethel
was made by a deed absolute subject to life estates and authorities are practically uniform to
the point that to justify a court in determining
from oral testimony that a deed which purports
to convey land absolutely in fee simple was intended to be something different, such as a
trust, such testimony must be clear and convincing. The proof must be something more than
that modicum of evidence which this Court
sometimes holds to be sufficient to warrant a
finding where the matter is not so serious as the
overthrow of a clearly expressed deed solemnly
executed and delivered.
"With respect to the standard and quality of
evidence required to establish an oral trust, the
court in the case of Chambers v. Emery stated:
Tn such even the proof must be strong, clear
and convincing such as to leave no doubt as to
the existence of the trust. Such a case is simi-
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lar to one where it is attempted to convert a
deed absolute into a mortgage or where the reformation of a written instrument is sought on the
grounds of accident, mistake or fraud. In all
such cases the court will scrutinize parole evidence with great caution and the Plaintiff must
fail unless it is clear, definitely unequivocal, and
conclusive. Public policy and the safety and
security of titles to real estate demand this rule
because such evidence is offered to overcome
the strong presumption arising from problems
and conditions of an instrument in writing, which
is always the best evidence of title. / / it were
once established that the effect of the terms of
a written instrument could be avoided by a bare
preponderance of parole evidence the gates to
perjury would soon be wide open and no person
could longer rest in the security of title to his
property, however solemn might be the instrument upon which it was founded.9" [Emphasis
OURS.]

The Court also reflected upon the fact that much of
the testimony was vague and self-serving and was subject
to the infirmities enumerated in the case of Chambers
v. Emery, 13 Utah 374, 45 P. 192, where the Court stated
that it is unsatisfactory and dangerous to depend wholly
upon recollection of witnesses who might have improper
or corrupt motives and may represent the deceased as
having expressed ideas precisely reverse of that which
was intended by him.
It appears that the Jewel v. Horner case, supra, had
facts much stronger to support Plaintiffs' contentions
than those found in this particular case, and yet this
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Court reversed the lower court. Once again, in this instant case the only evidence to show a contrary intention
on the part of Lucy Pagano is the alleged statement
claimed to have been made by Mary, the Defendant,
after the death of Lucy, whidti statement is vigorously
denied. There was no evidence at all adduced by Plaintiffs that Lucy intended other than a joint-tenancy account with all of the legal implications thereof at the
time of the creation of the joint-tenancy accounts with
Defendant. Even if in fact Lucy Pagano later had indicated a desire that Mary keep a little out for her arthritis and divide up the rest, this would not amount to
a legal over-throwing of the once established joint-tenancy account. Once that account had been established,
legally, with no reservations in the written instrument
between Lucy Pagano, Defendant, and the banks, they
could only be modified by an agreement by all three
parties, and there was absolutely no evidence of this happening offered into this case; certainly there was no evidence offered that Defendant ever accepted any trust,
or that she held the deposits in trust.
In a case very similar to this one at issue, decided
by our Supreme Court December 22, 1969, Woodward
v. Monson, 23 Utah 2d 318, 462 P. 2d 715, wherein the
heirs of a decedent brought an action to obtain their proportionate share of a bank account which had been created by the decedent with his daughter named as a
joint tenant, the Court reversed the lower court and once
again stated the law in Utah:
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"There is a presumption that joint^tenancy survivorship bank accounts create joint-tenancy with
full rights of survivorship, and that the heirs of
the decedent had failed to establish that jointtenancy survivoorship account opened by the decedent prior to his death with his daughter
named as a joint tenant was intended for convenience or business necessities of the decedent,
and therefore the balance of the account became
the sole property of the daughter through rights
of survivorship at the decedent's death."
In a very recent Utah Supreme Court case entitled
Nelson v. Nelson, Administrator, 30 Utah 2d 80, 513 P.
2d 1011, the Court made the following statement:
"The relationship of parent and child does not
constitute such confidential relationship as to
create a presumption of fraud or undue influence.
The evidence in tliis case is insufficient to show
a reposal of confidence by one party and the
resulting superiority and influence on the other
party."
In refusing to set aside a conveyance from the deceased
to his daughter, the Court stated:
"The Plaintiff has the burden of proof proving
with clear and convincing proof that the conveyance from Virgil to Teresa was obtained by fraud
and that Homer either participated in the fraud
or had knowledge of it." [Emphasis ours.]
The significance of this case is the fact that the Court
has once again stated that the Plaintiff has the burden
of proving by a clear and convincing proof.
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Our Supreme Court, in Spader v. Newbold, 29 Utah
2d 433, 511 P. 2d 153, reaffirmed the position in previous
oases and refused to set aside a joint-tenancy account
for the other heirs. The Court stated:
"Since she was protected by the prerogative of
relying on the universally accepted principle that
joint-tenancy documents be they bonds, bank or
savings accounts, deeds, negotiable instrument,
or the like, mean what they say and are invulnerable to any other meaning until attacked by
someone. The latter, representing the Plaintiffs
here, carries the burden of proving otherwise.
Such proof must be by dear and convincing evidence * * *."
We submit that the Plaintiffs, as a matter of law,
failed to prove a constructive trust and the trial court
erred in finding such.
POINT III.

THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ORDER OF
DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS IN JOINT
TENANCY WITH LUCY PAGANO AND DEFENDANT, MARY P. WALKER, AND REFUSAL TO AWARD ANY SUM TO DEFENDANT FOR HER ARTHRITIS.
If, for the sake of the argument, Mary P. Walker
did in fact make the statement attributed to her by
Plaintiffs, and if as the Court decided that there resulted
a constructive trust, it is the Defendant's position that
the Court erred in making a distribution as it did in the
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joint-tenancy accounts. Furthermore if the Court did
not err in distributing said funds ,then it is the position
of the Defendant that the Court erred in refusing to set
aside a sum to the Defendant for hear arthritis before
dividing up the accounts as it did.
We claim that the statement allegedly made by the
Defendant, Mary P. Walker, which she categorically denies: "Mother told me to pay the bills, keep a little out
for my arthritis and divide up the rest," is (1) so vague
and indefinite that it is unenforceable, and (2) such
words are precatory only and would only contribute an
expression of a hope or a desire rather than a legal mandate to do so. See In re Milton's Estate, 294 P. 2d 412.
Before giving effect to the alleged statement, the
Court must be able from competent evidence admitted
to determine (1) how much is "a little for my arthritis"
and determine the in/tent of Lucy if she made the statement "divide up the rest." The record is devoid of any
evidence upon which the Court could determine Lucy's
intent if she in fact made this statement, and if the
statement is to be given any legal effect; we submit that
the finding was arbitrary, capricious, and not based on
competent evidence.
The evidence is that Lucy knew that Mary had
arthritis; that she was being medically treated for the
same; that it would probably worsen as Mary grew older.
The only other evidence bearing on it at all was the fact
that Lucy had from time to time during her lifetime
made gifts not in equal amounts to her children and that
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she left a Will covering a part of her estate to be probated and divided among her children. No mention of
these deposits was made in the Will. All of these factors
together would make it necessary for the Court to guess
and pull out of thin air, its own interpretation what was
meant by the statement. We submit the Court did not
have sufficient or any facts upon which to make its
ruling. The phrase "keep a little out for my arthritis"
could mean anything from one cent up, (whose guess
would be correct?) and if the Court accepts the statement allegedly made by Mary it must give credence to
all of the statement. The Court arbitrarily gave credence
to one part of the claimed statement, but arbitrarily
refused to give credence to the other.
The phrase "divide up the rest" is likewise vague
and ambiguous. Does this mean divide up the rest equally
or does it mean divide up the resit upon the percentages
or with the differences as evidenced by past gifts given
by Lucy to her children during her lifetime — does it
mean among all of her children or some of her children,
or if one of her children had died leaving issue were they
to be included? We submit there is no evidence from which
the Court could make a determination as to what this
phrase meant in the absence of evidence bearing upon it.
The Court's finding was based upon an arbitrary, capricious, or conjectural construction by the Court, not upon
evidence of the party allegedly making the statement.
With respect to the Court's right to second guess the
parties or give legal effect to a situation which is so vague
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and ambiguous, one of the early cases is an Illinois case,
Young v. Farewell, (1892), 146 111. App. 299. In this case
the Court was called upon to decide the meaning of the
following words: "We will divide with you all of the profits
made over the last percentages," and "I will divide with
you all of the profits which your department makes over
your past average percentages of profit." In its attempt
to deteamine the meaning of the word "divide" as well as
the meaning of the phrases themselves, the Court stated
that an agreement to divide does not necessarily mean to
divide equally and it is uncertain from the whole contract
that such was the intention of the parties. Also the Court,
in commenting upon the uncertainties of the verbal statement, commented as follows:
"The Courts may and should in cases of doubt
give to words amtractually employed, such meaning as will effectuate the intention of the parties
when such intention may be gathered from all of
the circumstances surrounding the transaction,
but when from a consideration of all the circumstances it is impossible to determine when the
minds of the contracting parties met, the contract
must fail. We also think the contract must fail
because of other indefiniteness."
The final statement made by the Court which we feel
was and is the law, and properly so, was as follows:
"It is not the province of the Courts to make contracts for parties, nor to make certain and definite
what parties have left uncertain and indefinite
unless their intention is clearly and satisfactorily
proven."
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We feel this law, although decided long ago, is the proper
law in this case.
Although we have been unable to find a case exactly
in point with the instant case, we feel there have been a
number of Utah decisions analogous to it. In re Beals Estate, 117 Utah 189, 214 P. 2d 525, construing a Will, this
Court said:
"The rule of construction that the intent of the
testator must be carried out does not authorize
courts to make a new Will to conform to what
they think the testator intended, but the intent
of the testator must be ascertained in a Will as
it stands.'9 [Emphasis ours.]
The logical conclusion would be, then, that should the
intent of the testator not be determinable then that
must fail.
In a landmark Utah case, Chambers v. Emery, supra,
the Court set forth the rule with respect to giving legal
effect to vague and uncertain statements, and especially
with the dangers of parol evidence. The Court said:
"In such event the proof must be strong, clear
and convincing such as to leave no doubt as to
the existence of the trusts * * *. In all
such cases the court will scrutinize all parol
evidence with great caution and the plaintiff
must fail unless it is clear, definite, unequivocal and conclusive * * *. If it were
once established that the effects of the terms of
a written instrument could be avoided by bare
preponderance of parol evidence the gates to
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perjury would soon be wide open and no person
could longer rest in the security of his title to
property however solemn might be the instrument upon which it was founded." [Emphasis
ours.]
We submit this case is completely in point with
the case before this Court where written joint-tenancy
contracts were discussed, explained and made; Plaintiffs
now are attempting to modify the terms or destroy the
creation of the joint- tenancy accounts by parol evidence,
which was completely self-serving.
In Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P. 2d 427,
the Court said:
"A condition precedent to the enforcement of
any contract is that there is a meeting of the
minds of the parties which must be spelled out
either expressly or impliedly with sufficient
definiteness to be enforced * * *. The Court
cannot fabricate the kind of contract the parties ought to have made and then enforce it."
[Emphasis ours.]
A North Carolina case, Broadhurst v. Newborn, 88
S. E. 628, the Court held that it was the intention of
the testator that governs and it is not the Court's duty
nor its right to second guess the intent of the testator.
A Washington case, In re Milton's Estate, supra,
the Court held that a statement in the Will that it was
"contemplated that the money for the debts of the estate would come from the proceeds of insurance" were
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mere precatory words of the testator and insufficient to
be binding, and that such were nothing more than a wish
or a desire or expectation by the testator.
In Breckenridge v. Krocker, (Cal.), 21 P. 179, the
Court stated as follows:
"But to whatever form of action resort may be
had, the burden is on the plaintiff to show by
the writings that a contract definite and certain
by its terms was entered into by the parties, and
failing to do that he must fail to obtain relief."
In a California case, Inn Association v. Phillips, 56
Cal. 546, the Court stated: "A Court of equity will not
specifically enforce any contract unless it is completed
and certain."
Another California case, McGee v. McManus, 12 P.
451, states as follows:
"A thing agreed to be done must be definite and
certain in its terms and in itself and the party
who claims performance must make out by clear
and satisfactory proof the existence of the contract as he alleges it."
In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P. 2d
491, the Court said:
"Specific performance cannot be required unless all terms of the agreement are clear. The
Court cannot compel the performance of a contract which the parties did not mutually agree
upon." [Emphasis ours.]
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The Court cited a Colorado case, Boman v. Rayburn,
170 P. 2d 271, and quoted 71 American Jurisprudence
2d, Specific Performance, §22 p. 35, as follows:
"A contract must be free from doubt, vagueness
and ambiguities so as to leave nothing to conjecture or to be supplied by the Court. It must
be sufficiently certain and definite in its terms
as to leave no reasonable doubt as to what the
parties intended and no reasonable doubt of the
specific thing equity is called upon to have perfbormed, and it must be sufficiently certain as to
its terms so the court may enforce it as actually
made by the parties."
In Young v. Farewell, supra, the Court said:
"When from a consideration of all of the circumstances it is impossible to determine what is in
the mind of the (contracting parties the contract
must fail."
In Stoddard v. Montgomery, a Nebraska case, 98
N. W. 2d 875, the Court was called upon to construe the
meaning of a statute requiring the trial court to "divide"
the attorneys' fees awarded in real property partition
case among the attorneys of record. The Court after
some learned discussion held that the word "divide" does
not necessarily mean separate and equal parts.
We submit that if somehow this Court should find
that the Defendant did in fact make the statement attributed to by her brothers and the wife of one brother,
and if somehow a constructive trust was intended, even

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
so the Court could not properly make a division of the
monies in the joint-tenancy accounts because in order
to do so the Court would have to flip a coin, draw a
number out of a hat, or make some other arbitrary determination as to how much is "a little for my arthritis"
and then guess as to what Lucy Pagano meant when she
said "divide up the rest" — on what share basis, and
with whom? We submit the Court should not and could
not substitute its own thinking in order to cure a deficiency created by one of the parties to an action, and
as this Supreme Court has stated, In re Beat's Estate,
supra, the Court does not have the right to make a new
Will to conform to what they think the testator intended,
or in the Broadhurst case, supra, it is not the Court's
right nor its duty to second guess the intent of the testator, or as stated in Young v. Farewell, supra, decided
before the turn of the century:
"It is not the province of the Courts to
make contracts for the parties and to make
certain and definite what parties have left uncertain and indefinite, unless their intention is
clearly and satisfactorily proven."
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING O B J E C T I O N S TO DEFENDANT'S
PROFFERED EVIDENCE.
Defendant offered into evidence testimony concerning the statements of Lucy Pagano relating to Lucy's
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intentions with respect to the ownership of the funds
pdaoed in the joint-tenancy accounts by her with the
Defendant. The evidence was offered through Lynn A.
Walker, husband of the Defendant, and son-in-law of
the deceased^ Lucy Pagano. Mr. Walker was not directly interested in the outcome of the proceedings as
contemplated by our deadman's statute. He would receive no money regardless of the outcome of this case and
was not an heir or devisee of Lucy Pagano.
Mr. Walker was first asked if Lucy had ever told
him that she did not want her sons to know about the
joint bank accounts involved. The Court sustained the
objection of Plaintiffs Counsel, based upon the deadman's statute. Later Defendant made an offer of evidence to the Court out of the hearing of the Jury. The
offer of evidence being substantially that Lucy Pagano
had stated to Mary and himself, as she gave Mary the
pass books, that the boys were just waiting for her to
die, that they wanted to get their hands on some of this
money, that she wanted Mary to pay her personal bills,
and after that, the balance of the money was to be hers,
meaning Mary's. Once again the Court sustained the
objection of Plaintiffs' Counsel to this offer of evidence,
stating that it came within the purview of the dead-man's
statute. Mr. Walker had testified that he had been with
Mary Walker, the Defendant, on the occasions described
by Plaintiffs, and Mary had never stated that she was
told by her mother that she was to divide up the rest
of the monies in the joint-tenancy accounts, and that
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Mary had always indicated that her mother had given
her the money — the only limitation was that Mary
pay her personal bills.
Our Deadman's Statute, 78-24-2 (3) Utah Code
Annotated^ 1953, states as follows:
"Who may not be witnesses. — The following
persons cannot be witnesses * * * (3) a
party to any civil action, suit, or pleading and
any person directly interested in the event
thereof, and any person from, through or under
whom such party or interested person derived
his interest or title or any pant thereof when
the adverse party in such action or proceedings
claims or opposes, sues or defends as guardian
of an insane or incompetent person, or as the
executor, or administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian,
assignee, or grantee directly or remotely of such
heir, legatee or devisee as to any statement by
or transaction with such deceased, insane or
incompetent person, or matter of fact whatever,
which must have been equally within the knowledge of the witness and such insane, incompetent or deceased person, unless such witness is
called to testify thereto by such adverse party
so daiming or opposing, suing or defending in
such action, suit or proceeding."
It is our position that Lynn A. Walker, who was not
suing or defending, as guardian or Administrator, or Executor, or an heir and who would not receive any of the
proceeds of the accounts in question is not precluded
from testifying under this Statute. He had not received
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any property that was involved in this action from Lucy
Pagano and he would not receive any property involved
in this suit regardless of the outcome thereof. As was
stated in Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P.
2d 122, 125, the purpose of the Statute was to get to the
truth of the matters:
"It was never intended that this section should
be used for the purpose of suppressing the truth.
On the contrary, the Statute's sole purpose is to
prevent the proving by false testimony of claims
against the estate of the deceased person."
In this same case the Court went on to say:
"If the witness is opposing or suing the Executor, or if the witness has a direct interest in the
event of the suit a prohibition of the Statute
applies."
And further:
"We think the legislature intended by the term
'adverse party' to disqualify only those witnesses
who have a direct interest in the event of that
particular action, adverse to the interests of the
estate. See Mowesr v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228
p 911 * * v>
In Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P. 2d 78,
decided by the Supreme Court in 1963, Plaintiff brought
an action against the Executrix of the Estate of Leonard
Derle Gardner. A witness, Blake Probert, was precluded
from testifying as to facts that must have been equally
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in the knowledge of both the witness and the deceased
person. The witness also, had a similar claim against
the estate. The trial Court permitted Probert to testify
and the Court upheld the trial Court's ruling, stating:
"While this Statute obviously has a salutary
purpose in many instances its effect is to suppress inquiry into the truth rather than to assist
in its discovery. For that reason this Court has
heretofore indicated that it should be construed
and applied strictly, and that it will only disqualify a witness who has an interest in the particular subject matter of the action in which he
is challenged as a witness. More specifically applicable to the issue before us is the holding in
our case of Clark v. George, that in an action
for specific performance the challenged witness
must have a direct interest in the contract which
was the subject matter of the action in order
to fall under the ban of this Statute.
The trial court correctly ruled that the fact that
Probert had a claim of a similar nature against
this estate would not disqualify him as a witness,"
CONCLUSION
It is our contention that Lucy Pagano, mother of
Plaintiffs and Defendant, was a knowledgeable person
knowing full well the legal implications of a joint-tenancy account, she herself having received her property
through joint-tenancy accounts with her husband. Lucy
opened the various joint-tenancy accounts (the subject
matber of this suit) with the Defendant, her daughter
Mary P. Walker, and at the time of the creation of these
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joint-tenancy accounts there was no declaration or other
indication they were to be held in trust for the Plaintiffs
or any other person. We contend, the only evidence
that the moneys in the said joint-<tenancy accounts were
to be held in trust for the Plaintiffs was the alleged statement made by Mary, which she vigorously denies. This
evidence was, of course, self-serving on the part of Plaintiffs. When Defendant offered evidence through Lynn
A. Walker of statements showing the true intent of Lucy
Pagano with respect; to the joint-tenancy accounts, the
Court refused to permit this evidence, which we feel was
the only independent evidence to help ascertain the
truth of the matter and what justice is all about. We
feel the refusal to admit the evidence was error in that
this was not a suit by or against an estate of the deceased person and the witness had no direct interest
in the outcome of the case. Plaintiffs did not offer any
evidence as to when their mother was supposed to have
made this statement to Mary, and it is our feeling that
once the joint-tenancy was established with no showing
of a trust relationship thiis could not be modified without
the consent of Lucy, Mary, and the banks, on which
point there was no evidence whatsoever. Even if this
statement was made, it is our contention that it would
not change the original terms of the joint^tenancy accounts; that the statement would be so vague and ambiguous as to be unenforceable even if made and that
at the most the statement would have been a precatory
statement rather than a legally enforceable trust
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If the ruling of the lower Court should be upheld,
there would be, as a practical maitter, no joint^tenancy
account enforceable in the State of Utah — no jointtenancy account that could be enforced if contested by
any interested party. In this matter there was no clear
and convincing evidence found in the transcript of the
proceedings and not even a preponderance of the evidence; that from either standpoint — eventuary or under the legal aspect — a trust could be found.
If such a trust, j s found to be legally established,
then it is^Phsmi&! contention that the Court would be
unable to determine the intent of the trustor from the
evidence offered and such could not be enforced. The
Court cannot substitute its intention for that of the
trustor. If, however, the Court finds a valid trust and
is able to ascertain the intention of the trustor from the
evidence, then Defendant contends that the Court was
arbitrary and capricious in distributing the funds in
equal shares to each of the children and refusing to give
credence to the alleged statement "Mary is to have a
little for her arthritis." Her arthritis is real and becoming progressively worse and more expensive. This could
amount to large sums over the period of her life span
and the Court should have made a determination as to
what a reasonable amount would have been.
It seems obvious that Lucy created exactly what
she wanted to — a joint-tenancy account with Mary P.
Walker. Lucy left an estate in addition to the joint-tenancy accounts at her death, which said estate is in the
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process of being probated and will be distributed to her
children. There would be no logical reason to leave part
in joint-tenancy to be divided among her children and a
separate estate to be divided among her children.
We respectfully submit that the trial court should
be reversed and that Mary P. Walker, the Defendant,
declared to be the sole owner of the joint-tenancy funds;
or that failing, the case be remanded to the lower court
for a new trial, for the purpose of determining what is
a reasonable sum for Mary's arthritis and based upon
competent evidence in what proportions and to whom
the balance should be divided.
Respectfully submitted,
IRA A. HUGGINS &
I. GORDON HUGGINS OF
HUGGINS & HUGGINS
Attorneys for Appellant
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